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I. PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING 
Appellant is unaware of any parties other than those 
disclosed in the caption. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the trial court's order denying 
Appellant Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah's ("Blue Cross" or 
"Defendant") motion to compel arbitration. Jurisdiction is 
granted under Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-31a-19(l). 
V, STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Issues 
Blue Cross raises the following issues on appeal. 
The issue before the Court is whether the McCoys' insurance 
policy was validly amended to include an arbitration clause 
requiring that Appellant Gerald McCoy's ("McCoy" or "Plaintiff") 
claims be submitted to arbitration. Blue Cross appeals the trial 
court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. 
Specifically, 
1. Blue Cross appeals the trial court's finding that 
"Blue Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms. [Edwina] Green 
as evidence that they mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr. 
McCoy." Findings, \ 6. (R. 277). In fact, Blue Cross 
submitted, with the trial court's permission, Affidavits from two 
other individuals and a Supplemental Affidavit of Edwina Green 
showing the arbitration agreement was mailed. 
2. Blue Cross appeals the trial court's conclusion 
that "Ms. Green's affidavit does not rise to the level of proof 
of mailing." Conclusions, \ 4. (R. 278-279). In fact, the 
evidence of mailing was unrebutted. 
3. Blue Cross appeals the trial court's conclusion 
that Blue Cross "failed to establish that Mr. McCoy's notice of 
276434.2 
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the arbitration amendment was ever mailed to him." Conclusions, 
H 5. (R. 279). As noted, the evidence of mailing was 
essentially unrebutted. 
Blue Cross also appeals the trial court's failure to rule on 
its argument that McCoy's failure to object to the arbitration 
provision for approximately two years after he admitted becoming 
aware of the provision constituted binding acceptance of its 
terms. (R. 233-234) 
B. Standcird of Review 
Generally, "[a] trial court's denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration presents a question of law which [is reviewed] for 
correctness." Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996). 
Ordinarily, a trial court's findings of fact will be upheld 
unless "clearly erroneous." Drake v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 
939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). In this context, however, if the 
trial court determined there was a disputed issue of fact, the 
appropriate procedure was to hold an evidentiary hearing. Buzas 
Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 949 n.7 (Utah 
1996). No such hearing was held; instead, the trial court based 
its decision on affidavits submitted by the parties. Because the 
trial court's ruling was based on Affidavits and other documents, 
review is de novo. In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 
(Utah App. 1988) ("Because the trial court's finding was based 
solely on the written materials [affidavits] and involved no 
assessment of witness credibility or competency, this court is in 
as good a position as the trial court to examine the evidence de 
i 
novo and determine the facts."); see also Giblin By Helm v. 
276434.2 2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Giblin. 854 P.2d 816, 824 (Kan. 1993) (applying de novo standard 
review where controlling facts of case are based upon written or 
documentary evidence by way of pleadings, admissions, depositions 
and stipulation, because trial court has no particular 
opportunity to evaluate credibility of witnesses, and in such 
situations, appellate court has as good an opportunity to examine 
and consider evidence as trial court); Heskett v. Heskkett, 896 
P.2d 1200, 1202 (Okl. App. 1995) (noting that when facts 
presented to trial court by stipulation, deposition and other 
documentary material, appellate court was free to substitute its 
analysis of record for trial court's analysis); Stangler v. 
Anderson Meyers Drilling Co., 746 P.2d 99, 101-102 (Mont. 1987) 
(noting that where crucial testimony is taken by deposition, the 
Supreme Court will examine findings more closely, as it is in as 
good a position as lower court to assess evidence); Pena v. 
Westland Dev. Co., Inc., 761 P.2d 438, 445, cert, denied 759 P.2d 
200 (N.M. App. 1988) (noting that while ordinarily trial court is 
proper arbitrator of credibility of witnesses and testimony, 
where testimony is by deposition, appellate court may evaluate 
testimony as well as trial court). 
Fundamentally, the trial court's decision in this case was 
based on a determination that Blue Cross had failed to meet its 
burden of demonstrating mailing of the arbitration provision. 
(R. 277-279). That is a conclusion of law. Accordingly, the 
trial court's findings in this case, as well as its conclusions 
of law, should be reviewed de novo. In addition, review of these 
issues must be conducted in light of the well established rule 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that under Utah law all doubts are resolved in favor of 
arbitration. Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359. 
C. Relevant Statutes 
1. Section 3 of the Utah Arbitration Act provides: 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or 
equity to set aside the agreement or when fraud is 
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3 (1997). 
2. The Utah Insurance Code provides the following 
regarding the right of an insurer to renew a policy: 
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the 
policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, 
the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date 
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to 
the policy holder notice of the new terms or rates at 
least 3 0 days prior to the expiration date of the prior 
policy. If the insurer did not give this prior 
notification to the policy holder, the new terms or 
rates do not take effect until 30 days after the notice 
is delivered or sent by first class mail, in which case 
the policy holder may elect to cancel the renewal 
policy at any time during the 3 0-day period. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994). 
3. The Utah Insurance Code provides the following 
regarding the right of an insurer to modify a policy: 
Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as 
otherwise mandated by law no purported modification of 
the contract during the term of the policy affects the 
obligations of a party to the contract unless the 
modification is in writing and agreed to by the party 
against whose interest the modification operates. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
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VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel 
arbitration. Plaintiff and Appellee Gerald McCoy ("McCoy or 
"Plaintiff") claims that defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Utah ("Blue Cross" or "Defendant") refused coverage for treatment 
of for his wife's breast cancer, in particular, a bone marrow 
transplant, under a health insurance policy issued by Blue Cross. 
Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint"), H1 7-14 (R. 4-5). 
Blue Cross moved for arbitration, based upon language 
contained in a number of documents. (R. 17-29). In particular, 
Blue Cross presented evidence that in November of 1985 it sent 
all individual policy holders a letter (the "First Mailing") and 
an "Endorsement to Basic Health Care Agreement" (the 
"Endorsement"), by submission of the Affidavit of Edwina H. Green 
("Green I Affidavit") . (R. 31, 34-36) . The letter accompanying 
the Endorsement read, in part: 
We would also like to announce that effective January 
1, 1986, we will adopt an arbitration procedure for the 
resolution of any disputes you may have with Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Utah. 
(R. 34). The Endorsement included the following arbitration 
provision: 
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning 
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach 
of this Agreement arising between the Employer, 
Subscriber, eligible Family Member, or the heir-at-law 
or personal representative of such person, and the 
Plan, whether involving a claim in tort, contract, or 
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to the 
arbitration under the appropriate rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
276434.2 5 
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(R. 35). 
Blue Cross also presented evidence that in early 1986, all 
policy holders of individual health insurance policy Qualifier I-
Type 57H were sent the new edition of the Health Care Agreement 
(the "Second Mailing"), incorporating the terms of the 
Endorsement into the existing policy (the "Amended Policy"). (R. 
21, 32, 38-42). The Amended Policy contains a binding 
arbitration provision which states: 
Binding arbitration is the final step for the 
resolution of any dispute. When you enroll as a Member 
of the Plan, you agree that any dispute will be 
resolved by binding arbitration, and agree to give up 
the right to a jury or court trial for a settlement of 
such dispute . . . . 
(R. 40). The Amended Policy also provides: 
In the event of any dispute of controversy concerning 
the . . . performance . . . of this Agreement arising 
between the . . . Subscriber, eligible Family Member . 
. . (and) the Plan, . . . the same shall be submitted 
to arbitration under the appropriate rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. 
(R. 41). Finally, in 1990 a 1989 reprint of the Health Care 
Agreement Qualifier I - Type 57H policy, also containing 
arbitration language (collectively, with the Amended Policy, the 
"Amended Policies"), was sent to policyholders by mail (the 
"Third Mailing"). (R. 22, 32, 44-47A). Collectively or 
separately, the statements in the Endorsement and Amended 
Policies (the "Arbitration Provisions") called for arbitration of 
all disputes arising between McCoy and Blue Cross. (R. 4-5). 
Plaintiff did not contest the scope of the Arbitration 
Provisions. Instead, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that 
276434.2 6 
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he did not receive any of the First, Second, or Third Mailings. 
(R. 61, 64-68, 81). 
The trial court ordered supplemental briefing on, among 
others, the issues of notice to the McCoys and "whether or not 
plaintiff waived objection to arbitration after notice was 
received by plaintiff (in Jan., 1995)." (R. 228). After 
supplemental briefing, the trial court denied the motion to 
compel arbitration, ruling only on the issue of whether Blue 
Cross proved the Arbitration Provisions were mailed to the 
McCoys. This appeal followed. (R. 276-280, 281-283). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff sued Blue Cross, alleging that Blue Cross refused 
coverage for treatment for his wife's breast cancer, in 
particular, a bone marrow transplant, under a health insurance 
policy issued by Blue Cross. 
Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration as to all of these 
claims. (R. 17-47) . After detailed briefing by both parties (R. 
60-87, 148-219, 230-268), the trial court denied Blue Cross's 
Motion to Compel Arbitration, by Order entered on March 5, 1998, 
and captioned "Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order" 
(appellant will refer to the trial court's findings of fact as 
"Findings," the trial court's conclusions of law as "Conclusions" 
and the March 5, 1998 Order generally as the "Order"). (R. 276-
280). The Notice of Appeal was filed March 11, 1998. (R. 281-
283) . 
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
The district court denied Blue Cross's Motion to Compel 
arbitration. (R. 276-280) . Blue Cross filed this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-31a-19(1). (R. 281-83). 
VII, SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Blue Cross principally appeals two aspects of the trial 
court's ruling denying its motion to compel arbitration. First, 
Blue Cross appeals the trial court's ruling that Blue Cross did 
not demonstrate that the Arbitration Provisions were mailed to 
the McCoys. 
In fact, the unrebutted evidence demonstrates that Blue 
Cross proved the McCoys were mailed the Arbitration Provisions. 
Blue Cross submitted an Affidavit of Edwina Green ("Green I 
Affidavit"), and additional affidavits from Keith Stoddard (the 
"Stoddard Affidavit") and Gary Nelson (the "Nelson Affidavit") as 
evidence the First Mailing was sent to Mr. McCoy. (R. 237-241, 
249-253). In addition, Blue Cross submitted a Supplemental 
Affidavit of Edwina Green ("Green II Affidavit"). (R. 242-248). 
The Green II Affidavit specifically set forth the process by 
which Plaintiff was sent the First Mailing, under either of the 
two possible subscriber groups the McCoys could have been part of 
at the time of mailing. Green II Affidavit, UK 6-14 (R. 244-
245). Thus, the McCoys7 name and address would have been 
contained on the magnetic tape sent to the printer. Green II 
Affidavit, HH 5-9 (R. 243-244) . The Stoddard Affidavit 
established that in the ordinary course of its business, Image 
Printing (the "Printer") received this magnetic tape from Blue 
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Cross and inserted all of the names thereon into the First 
Mailing. Stoddard Affidavit, 11 6-9 (R. 238-239) . Similarly, 
the Nelson Affidavit established that in the ordinary course of 
its business, Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (the "Mailer") 
received the First Mailing from the Printer, and delivered the 
mailing to the United States Postal Service. Nelson Affidavit, 
11 6-9 (R. 250-252). 
Under Utah law, amendment to the policy and notice by 
mailing -- when such notice has been agreed to by contract --is 
valid and enforceable. Diamond T. Utah, Inc. v. Canal Insurance 
Company, 361 P.2d 665 (Utah 1961); Bennett Motor Company v. Lyon, 
380 P.2d 69 (Utah 1963) . And, Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. 
Co., 851 P.2d 647 (Utah App. 1993), held that, on facts nearly 
identical to those here, a mere denial of receipt is insufficient 
to defeat evidence that the insurer followed its standard mailing 
practice. 
Second, Blue Cross also appeals the trial court's implicit 
rejection of the argument that Plaintiff's retention of the 
policy for two years after he was admittedly aware of the 
arbitration provision constituted a waiver of his right to 
object. The District Court for the Central District of Utah, 
Judge Winder presiding, has ruled that an insured's retention of 
an insurance policy for an extended period of time, without 
objection within a reasonable time, "constitutes an acceptance of 
the Policy, including the arbitration provision." Imperial Sav. 
Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (D. Utah 1990); see also 
Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47 (N.M. 
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1968) (same); Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 
457 P.2d 558 (Okla. 1969) (same). In Imperial Savings, Judge 
Winder determined that an insured's retention of the policy in 
question for only eleven months was sufficiently long to 
constitute an unreasonably long period of time without objection. 
Id. In this case, McCoy's failure to state his objection for at 
least two years, after he was admittedly on notice of the 
arbitration provision, constitutes waiver of any right to object 
to the inclusion of that arbitration provision in his insurance 
policy. McCoy is therefore required to arbitrate any disputes 
over coverage under the Policy. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
Blue Cross appeals the trial court's ruling denying its 
motion to compel arbitration. The unrebutted evidence 
demonstrates that Blue Cross proved the McCoys were mailed the 
Arbitration Provisions. Blue Cross also appeals the trial 
court's implicit rejection of the argument that Plaintiff's 
retention of the policy for two years after he was admittedly 
aware Of the arbitration provision constituted a waiver of his 
right to object. 
A. Background - Factual Record1 
In the Complaint and Jury Demand ("Complaint"), Plaintiff 
Gerald McCoy ("McCoy" or "Plaintiff") claimed that defendant Blue 
1
 Although Appellant does not believe it necessary to marshall 
the evidence on appeal because the issue is whether to grant a 
motion to compel arbitration (which is favored under Utah law), 
this section also serves to marshall all the evidence presented 
to the trial court on the relevant issues. 
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Cross and Blue Shield of Utah ("Blue Cross" or "Defendant") 
improperly refused coverage for treatment for his wife's breast 
cancer, in particular, a bone marrow transplant, under a health 
insurance policy issued by Blue Cross. Complaint, UK 7-14 (R. 4-
5). Specifically, McCoy alleged claims arising out of his 
purchase of a Blue Cross "Qualifier One" policy of health 
insurance (the "Policy") through Blue Cross, effective on October 
3, 1985. Complaint, 1 3 (R. 3). 
Blue Cross moved to compel arbitration, based upon language 
contained in the Policy since January, 1986. (R. 17-29). In 
particular, Blue Cross presented evidence that it sent all 
individual policy holders a letter and an "Endorsement to Basic 
Health Care Agreement" (the "Endorsement") in November of 1985 
(the "First Mailing"), by submission of the Affidavit of Edwina 
H. Green ("Green I Affidavit"). (R. 31, 34-36). The letter 
accompanying the Endorsement read, in part: 
We would also like to announce that effective January 
1, 1986, we will adopt an arbitration procedure for the 
resolution of any disputes you may have with Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Utah. 
(R. 34). The Endorsement included the following arbitration 
provision: 
In the event of any dispute or controversy concerning 
the construction, interpretation, performance or breach 
of this Agreement arising between the Employer, 
Subscriber, eligible Family Member, or the heir-at-law 
or personal representative of such person, and the 
Plan, whether involving a claim in tort, contract, or 
otherwise, the same shall be submitted to the 
arbitration under the appropriate rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
276434.2 H 
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(R. 35). 
Blue Cross also presented evidence, also through the Green I 
Affidavit, that in early 1986, all policy holders of individual 
health insurance policy Qualifier I-Type 57H were sent the new 
edition of the Health Care Agreement (the "Second Mailing"), 
incorporating the terms of the Endorsement (the "Amended 
Policy") . (R. 21, 32, 38-42) . The Amended Policy contains a 
binding arbitration provision which states: 
Binding arbitration is the final step for the 
resolution of any dispute. When you enroll as a Member 
of the Plan, you agree that any dispute will be 
resolved by binding arbitration, and agree to give up 
the right to a jury or court trial for a settlement of 
such dispute . . . . 
(R. 40). The Amended Policy also provides: 
In the event of any dispute of controversy concerning 
the . . . performance . . . of this Agreement arising 
between the . . . Subscriber, eligible Family Member . 
. . (and) the Plan, . . . the same shall be submitted 
to arbitration under the appropriate rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. 
(R. 41). Finally, Blue Cross presented evidence through the 
Green I Affidavit that, in 1990, a 1989 reprint of the Health 
Care Agreement Qualifier I - Type 57H policy, also containing 
arbitration language (collectively, with the Amended Policy, the 
"Amended Policies"), was distributed to policyholders by mail 
(the "Third Mailing") . (R. 22, 32, 44-47A). Collectively or 
separately, the statements in the Endorsement and Amended 
Policies (the "Arbitration Provisions") called for arbitration of 
all disputes arising between the McCoys and Blue Cross. 
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Plaintiff responded by arguing, among other things, that he 
did not receive any of the First, Second or Third Mailings, (R. 
61, 64-68, 81), by filing the Affidavit of Gerald McCoy ("McCoy I 
Affidavit") . (R. 79-85) . The relevant portions of the McCoy I 
Affidavit follow: 
5. I was a senior contract manager on the Trans-
Alaska pipeline and have reviewed and managed other 
contracts professionally. As a businessman involved in 
the formation and administration of contracts, I am 
aware of the importance of documenting changes in 
contracts and the importance of record keeping. 
6. My wife, Frieda McCoy, was librarian and was 
also aware of the importance of record keeping. 
7. My wife and I kept all documents and 
correspondence we received from Blue Cross relating to 
the Qualified I plan. 
8. I have reviewed my records and have not found 
a copy of the November 25, 1985, letter and endorsement 
attached to the Affidavit of Edwina H. Green dated May 
27, 1997, as Exhibit A, nor have I found copies of the 
Health Care Agreements portions of which are attached 
to Ms. Green's affidavit as exhibits B and C. 
9. I do not recall ever having received copies 
of any of the attachments to Ms. Green's affidavit at 
any time before January 1995, nor do I recall ever 
having received any other copy of the policy between 
November 1985 and January 1995. Because of my work in 
contracts, I believe I would remember if I had received 
a copy of the endorsement attached as exhibit A to Ms, 
Green's affidavit. 
(R. 80-81). 
In addition, Plaintiff admitted he was on notice of the 
arbitration provision by at least January, 1995: 
10. To the best of my knowledge, I never received 
notice of the arbitration requirement that Blue Cross 
alleges was added to the policy effective January 1, 
1986, until some time in January 1995. 
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(R. 81) (emphasis added). McCoy also admitted being placed on 
notice of the existence of arbitration language much earlier. 
In addition, McCoy admitted that since at least 1994, when 
the McCoys received medical seirvices, they were sent an 
Explanation of Benefits ("EOB") form. (R. 84). Plaintiff 
himself presented evidence to the trial court that the EOB forms 
sent to (and received by) the McCoys provided on the front of the 
form: 
If you disagree with our decision on your claim, you 
may ask us to reconsider. You also have the right to 
arbitration. 
And provided on the back of the form: 
If you are dissatisfied with the decision following 
review, you may have the right to have the matter 
arbitrated in accordance with the rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. 
EOB, attached as Exhibit 12 to McCoy I Affidavit (R. 135-136) 
(emphasis added). Plaintiff contended he did not read these 
words, and would not have understood this language to require 
arbitration. (R. 84). 
After Blue Cross replied to Plaintiff's arguments, (R. 148-
215), and argument was held (R. 228), the trial court ordered 
supplemental briefing on, among others, the issues of notice to 
the Plaintiff of the arbitration provisions, and "whether or not 
plaintiff waived objection to arbitration after notice was 
received by plaintiff (in Jan., 1995)." (R. 228). 
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Blue Cross submitted, pursuant to the Court's order, 
additional affidavits from Keith Stoddard (the "Stoddard 
Affidavit") and Gary Nelson (the "Nelson Affidavit") as evidence 
the First Mailing was received by Mr. McCoy. (R. 237-241, 249-
253). In addition, Blue Cross submitted a Supplemental Affidavit 
of Edwina Green ("Green II Affidavit"). (R. 242-248). 
As discussed in detail below, the Green II Affidavit 
specifically set forth the process by which Plaintiff was sent 
the First Mailing, under both of the two possible subscriber 
groups the McCoys would have been part of at the time of mailing. 
Green II Affidavit, 11 6-14 (R. 244-245). Thus, the McCoys' name 
and address would have been contained on the magnetic tape sent 
to the printer. Green II Affidavit, 11 5-9 (R. 244-245). The 
Stoddard Affidavit established that in the ordinary course of its 
business, Image Printing (the "Printer") received this magnetic 
tape from Blue Cross and inserted all of the names thereon into 
the First Mailing. Stoddard Affidavit, 11 6-9 (R. 238-239). 
Similarly, the Nelson Affidavit established that in the ordinary 
course of its business, Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (the 
"Mailer") received the First Mailing from the Printer, and 
delivered the mailing to the United States Postal Service. 
Nelson Affidavit, 11 6-9 (R. 250-252). 
Plaintiff submitted the Supplemental Affidavit of Gerald 
McCoy ("McCoy II Affidavit") wherein he contended, for the first 
time, that when he admittedly learned of his right to arbitration 
276434.2 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in January, 1995, he understood it as optional, not mandatory. 
McCoy II Affidavit, H 2-5 (R. 265-66). 
The trial court issued its "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order" on February 26, 1998. The trial court ruled that 
Blue Cross did not establish that the arbitration provisions were 
mailed to the McCoys, ruling, in relevant part, as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
6. Blue Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms. 
Green as evidence that they mailed an arbitration 
amendment to Mr. McCoy. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
4. Ms. Green's affidavit: does not rise to the level of 
proof of mailing. Ms. Green's affidavit cannot say whether 
or not Mr. McCoy's name and address were actually on the 
tape, an important fact in determining whether or not Mr. 
McCoy's arbitration amendment was ever mailed. 
5. Blue Cross has failed to establish that Mr. 
McCoy's notice of arbitration amendment was ever mailed 
to him. Consequently, Blue Cross cannot apply the 
arbitration amendment to him. 
(R.276-279). As discussed below, Blue Cross appeals the trial 
court's Findings, Conclusions, and Order. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Its Ruling That the McCoys 
Did Not Agree to the Arbitration Provisions 
1. Blue Cross Did Not Rely Solely on the Green I 
Affidavit as Evidence the Arbitration Agreement 
Was Mailed to the McCoys 
Blue Cross appeals the trial court's finding that "Blue 
Cross relies solely on the affidavit of Ms. [Edwina] Green as 
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evidence that they mailed an arbitration amendment to Mr. McCoy." 
Findings, % 6 (R. 277) (emphasis added). In fact, Blue Cross 
submitted Affidavits from two other individuals, the Stoddard 
Affidavit and the Nelson Affidavit, as evidence the First Mailing 
was received by Mr. McCoy. (R. 237-241, 249-253). In addition, 
Blue Cross submitted the Green II Affidavit. (R. 242-248). It 
is apparent, therefore, that the trial court not only erred in 
finding that Blue Cross relied "solely" upon the Green I 
Affidavit, but that the trial court also improperly failed to 
consider the contents of the Green II Affidavit, and the Stoddard 
and Nelson Affidavits. The specific evidence presented by these 
affidavits is discussed below. 
2. The Supplemental Affidavits Established Proof of 
Mailing the Arbitration Provisions 
Blue Cross appeals the trial court's conclusion that "Ms. 
Green's affidavit does not rise to the level of proof of 
mailing." Conclusions, % 4 (R. 278-279). Blue Cross also 
appeals the trial court's conclusion that it "failed to establish 
that Mr. McCoy's notice of the arbitration amendment was ever 
mailed to him." Conclusions, H 5 (R. 279). A review of all the 
affidavits submitted demonstrates that Blue Cross met its burden 
of proof. And, the evidence regarding mailing was unrebutted. 
Contrary to the trial court's rulings, the Green I Affidavit 
established that, at the direction of Ms. Green: 
the programming department of [Blue Cross] prepared a 
tape of all subscribers who were to receive the [First 
Mailing]. The tape containing the subscriber list was 
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forwarded to Image Printing of Salt Lake City during 
the week of November 11, 1985. Image Printing printed 
the subscriber letter and inserted each subscriber's 
name and address on Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah 
letterhead. The completed letter, with the endorsement 
prepared by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah was then 
forwarded to Progressive Direct Mail Advertising of 
Salt Lake City for mailing. 
Green I Affidavit, f 4 (R. 31) (emphasis added); see also Green 
II Affidavit, f 5 (R. 243) (same). The Green II Affidavit 
specifically detailed the process by which Plaintiff was sent the 
First Mailing, under either of two policies the McCoys could have 
been covered by at the time of mailing: 
6. According to BCBSU's current records, on or about 
October 1, 1985, Mr. McCoy's name was input into 
BCBSU's system as a subscriber to a 1GE plan, which is 
a group plan. 
7. Approximately one week later, Mr. McCoy's 
insurance was converted to the above-mentioned 57H non-
group individual contract. 
8. On or about November 11, 1985, a magnetic tape 
was made that would have included Mr. McCoy, since he 
was then carried on the BCBSU system as a subscriber 
under 57H non-group, individual contract, and all such 
subscribers were included on the magnetic tape. 
9. In addition, also included on the magnetic tape 
were all subscribers under the 1GE group plan of which 
Mr. McCoy had been a subscriber for approximately two 
weeks. Thus, even if Mr. McCoy's membership had not 
yet been transferred to the 57H non-group individual 
contract subscribers, he would still have been included 
in the mailing by virtue of his having been a member of 
the 1GE group plan because that particular group plan 
was included in the mailing. 
Green II Affidavit, H 6-9 (R. 244-245) (emphasis added) 
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Green "cannot 
say" whether the McCoys' name and address was included on the 
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tape is clearly in error; the clear preponderance of evidence is 
that it would have been on the magnetic tape. (R. 244-245). 
Further, Blue Cross showed that the tape was then used to 
mail the printed amendments: 
10. On or about November 14, 1965, the magnetic tape 
was sent to Image Printing ("Image") for printing of 
the subscribers' names and addresses on the cover 
letter to the amendment endorsement. 
11. In addition, at the time the foregoing magnetic 
tape was sent to Image for preparation of the mailing 
materials, Mr. McCoy's name and address had not been 
removed from the list of names and addresses on the 
magnetic tape. 
12. After Image printed the mailing materials, it 
forwarded those materials to Progressive Direct Mail 
Advertising ("Progressive") for the insertion of the 
materials into envelopes and the actual mailing of the 
materials. 
13. After sending the mailing materials to Image, I 
received confirmation from Image that Progressive had 
completed the bulk mailing of 30,356 pieces of mail on 
November 25, 1985. 
14. I also received confirmation from Image, in the 
form of an invoice date December 6, 1985, that 
Progressive had mailed 30,356 pieces of mail to BCBSU 
subscribers. 
Green II Affidavit, UK 10-14 (R. 244-245). The Stoddard 
Affidavit established that in the ordinary course of its 
business, Image Printing (the "Printer") received the magnetic 
tape from Blue Cross, and inserted all of the names thereon into 
the First Mailing. Stoddard Affidavit, H 6-9 (R. 238-239). 
Similarly, the Nelson Affidavit established that in the ordinary 
course of its business, Progressive Direct Mail Advertising (the 
"Mailer") received the mailing from the Printer, and delivered 
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the mailing to the United States Postal Service. Nelson 
Affidavit, KK 6-9 (R. 250-252). In addition, the Green I 
Affidavit established that the McCoys were sent the Second 
Mailing and Third Mailing, containing the Amended Policies, as 
policyholders. Green I Affidavit, f 7 (R. 22, 32, 44-47A ). 
The evidence of mailing was unrebutted. Mr. McCoy has never 
offered any evidence that the Arbitration Provisions were not 
mailed. Instead, he only argues that he did not receive any of 
the First, Second or Third Mailings. This is insufficient under 
Utah Law, which requires only proof that the Arbitration 
Provisions were mailed, as explained in the next section. 
3. Even if True, the Fact That Mr. McCoy Did Not 
Receive the First, Second, or Third Mailings is 
Irrelevant; Proof of Mailing is Enough 
As noted, Plaintiff's response to Blue Cross was that he did 
not receive the mailing. However, the issue is not whether Mr. 
McCoy received any of the mailings, but whether the Arbitration 
Provisions were mailed. Under the terms of the Policy -- the 
same document Mr. McCoy admits he received ("Complaint, f 3 (R. 
3)) --Mr. McCoy agreed the terms of the Policy could be amended 
by mailing -- not receipt. And, under Utah law, Blue Cross had 
the explicit right to modify the policy by mail. The second 
issue is addressed first. 
The McCoys agreed, under the terms of the Policy (and the 
Amended Policies) that notice by mail was acceptable. In 
addition, Plaintiff agreed, under the terms of the Policy (and 
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the Amended Policies), that Blue Cross had the "absolute right" 
to modify the Policy upon such notice. 
Specifically, under the Policy, Plaintiff agreed that the 
terms of riders duly issued by Blue Cross became part of the 
agreement between Plaintiff and Blue Cross: 
"Agreement" means this document and attached riders 
when duly issued by the Plan, the Subscriber's 
Identification Card issued in connection with this 
document, the Subscriber's health statement, and the 
Subscriber's application in any supplemental 
applications to the Plan for healthcare benefits 
hereunder. 
Policy, p. 23 (R. 150, 195) (emphasis added). Under the Policy, 
Plaintiff agreed to abide by any modification of the terms of 
the Policy upon written notice: 
D. MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT 
The Plan shall at all times have the absolute right to 
modify or amend this Agreement from time to time; 
provided, however, that no such modification or 
amendment shall be effective until thirty (30) days 
after written notice thereof has been given to the 
Subscriber. 
Policy, p. 36 (R. 202) (emphasis added). 
Finally, under the Policy, Plaintiff agreed that notice as 
provided for in the Policy would be deemed given and received 
once placed in the mail: 
Notices. Any notice to the Subscriber provided for in 
this Agreement shall be deemed to have been given to 
and received by the Subscriber when deposited in the 
United States Mail with first class postage prepaid and 
addressed to the Subscriber at the address shown in the 
records of the Plan. 
Policy, p. 42 (R. 205) (emphasis added). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that where parties to a 
contract agree to notice by mail, actual notice is not required 
to enforce the terms of the agreement. In Diamond T. Utah, Inc. 
v. Canal Insurance Company, 361 P.2d 665 (Utah 1961), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a provision in an 
insurance policy which provided that "The mailing of notice as 
aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice." Id. at 667. The 
Diamond T Court upheld the provision, reasoning as follows: 
The foregoing provision, known in the insurance 
trade as a "standard cancellation clause," has been the 
subject of many court decisions. The majority of these 
decisions, under what we believe to be the best 
reasoning, hold that the actual receipt of the 
cancellation notice by the insured is not a condition 
precedent to the cancellation of the insurance by the 
insurer, provided the cancellation notice itself 
contains a fixed date on which the cancellation is to 
become effective. The rationale of these decisions is 
that the express terms of the contract uphold the 
sufficiency of a notice deposited in the mail, and that 
such provision, being unambiguous, must be enforced as 
written. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also, Bennett Motor Company v. Lyon, 
380 P.2d 69, 71 (Utah 1963) (citing Diamond T and observing "The 
policy itself contained what is known as a 'standard cancellation 
clause7 in which it was provided the mailing of notice would be 
sufficient notice. Such provisions have been recognized.11). 
This rule was followed by the Utah Court of Appeals as recently 
as 1993.2 See Baumgart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 
2
 And, as the Utah Supreme Court noted in Diamond T, 
sufficiency of notice by mail is the majority rule. See, e.g., 
Bell v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 816 P.2d 407, 409 (Kan. App. 
(continued...) 
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647, 651-52 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) 
(citing and following Diamond T). 
Plaintiff also argued below that he did not agree to 
modification of the original Policy to include an arbitration 
provision, citing a provision of the Utah Insurance Code for the 
proposition that Blue Cross could not modify the Policy during 
its term (R. 65): 
Except as provided in Subsection (3) or (4), or as 
otherwise mandated by law no purported modification of 
the contract during the term of the policy affects the 
obligations of a party to the contract unless the 
modification is in writing and agreed to by the party 
against whose interest the modification operates. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-106(2) (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added). 
However, Section 31A-21-106(2) (entitled "Incorporation by 
reference") states only that modification of an insurance policy 
must be in writing (not that Plaintiff's agreement to the 
modification be in writing) and that Plaintiff must have "agreed" 
to the modification. The statute does not, however, require 
2
 (...continued) 
1991) (holding that where policy provided that "proof of mailing 
of any notice shall be sufficient proof of notice," "[n]either 
statute nor public policy requires the [insured] to have actually 
received the mailed notice of cancellation.11); Ouintana v. Tenn. 
Farmer's Mut. Ins. Co., 774 S.W. 2d 630, 633 (Tenn. App. 1989) 
("A majority of the courts construing similar clauses have held 
the insured need not actually receive the notice in order for the 
cancellation to be effective."); Har-Con Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 757 S.W. 2d 153, 154 (Tex. App. 1988) ("Where the 
parties have contracted as to the terms of cancellation of an 
^insurance policy, and have expressly agreed that mailing of 
Nnotice shall suffice for proof of notice of cancellation, the 
cancellation is effective upon the mailing of notice, even if the 
addressee never actually receives the notice."). 
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Plaintiff's agreement to take any particular form or be at any 
particular time. It cannot be disputed that Plaintiff was on 
notice that the Policy had been modified, by at least January of 
1995, and probably earlier becaiuse he received EOB forms 
expressly referencing the right to arbitrate. As noted, 
Plaintiff agreed even further in advance that his agreement would 
become effective upon mailing of notice. 
Furthermore, the Policy was not, as Plaintiff contended, 
modified during its term. Premiums on the McCoys' policy were 
due each quarter, and this modification was made effective at the 
end of its quarterly coverage. (R. 31, 34-35, 39) . Notice by 
mail is explicitly allowed by the Insurance Code at the time of 
renewal, if rates increase or the policy is renewed on "less 
favorable terms"3: 
[I]f the insurer offers or purports to renew the 
policy, but on less favorable terms or at higher rates, 
3
 Blue Cross does not agree that an arbitration provision 
is a "less favorable" term. In fact, Utah courts have ruled that 
arbitration is favored for over a century. See, e.g. Buzas 
Baseball v. Salt Lake Trappers, 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996) 
(fl[T]he Utah Arbitration Act "'reflects long-standing public 
policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating 
disputes.'") (citation omitted); Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. 
Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983) ("The Territory and State 
of Utah have had statutory provisions for arbitration of disputes 
since 1884."); Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P.2d 353, 
356 (Utah 1932) ("Arbitration is favored in the law . . . . " ) . 
In fact, arbitration grants Plaintiff the right to compel 
arbitration against Blue Cross, creating a mutually beneficial 
and reciprocal right in each of the parties, to the mutual 
benefit of each party. The mutual right to arbitrate is, in 
fact, ordinarily of significant benefit to an insured, who often 
does not have the financial resources to wage a traditional 
protracted legal battle against an insurance company. 
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the new terms or rates take effect on the renewal date 
if the insurer delivered or sent by first class mail to 
the policy holder notice of the new terms or rates at 
least 3 0 days prior to the expiration date of the prior 
policy. If the insurer did not give this prior 
notification to the policy holder, the new terms or 
rates do not take effect until 30 days after the notice 
is delivered or sent by first class mail, in which case 
the policy holder may elect to cancel the renewal 
policy at any time during the 3 0-day period. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-303(5)(a) (1994) (emphasis added).4 
Under Utah law, the Insurance Code specifically states that the 
new terms are effective if notice is given by first class mail. 
Again, as under the specific terms of the Policy, there is no 
requirement of actual notice. 
Plaintiff cannot now, more than ten years after agreeing to 
the terms of the Policy allowing modification and notice by mail, 
contend that he is not bound by the very terms of the document he 
4
 Numerous courts have enforced similar statutes, holding 
that actual receipt is not required under these circumstances. 
See, e.g. Atlanta Cas. Co, v Sweeney, 868 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Ark. 
1994) ("Whether the notice was received by [the insured] is 
irrelevant according to the statute, as "proof of mailing' is 
'sufficient proof of notice.'"): Balboa Ins. Co. v Hunter, 299 
S.E.2d 91, 92 (Ga. App. 1983) (holding that under statute 
allowing written notice to be delivered "by depositing such 
notice in the United States Mail" meant that "actual receipt of 
the notice is not necessary to effect cancellation if the notice 
of cancellation properly addressed and stamped for first class 
delivery was delivered to the postal authorities and a receipt 
obtained therefore."): Hemperly v Edna Casp. & Sur. Co., 516 
So.2d 1202, 1204 (La. App. 1987) (holding that under Louisiana 
statute, "[p]roof of mailing, notice of cancellation to the named 
insured of the address shown on the policy shall be sufficient 
proof of notice. Proof of receipt of that notice is not 
required."): Isaacson v DeMartin Agency, Inc., 893 P.2d 1123, 
1125 (Wash. App. 1995) ("Although [the insured] stated she did 
not receive a cancellation notice an insurer is not required to 
prove actual receipt if statutory mailing procedures are 
followed."). 
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is purportedly attempting to enforce. Plaintiff agreed by 
contract5 to certain procedures, and the law in the state of 
Utah at all times has held these procedures to be acceptable and 
controlling of the issues here. 
4. Blue Cross Presented Sufficient Proof of Mailing 
In essence, the trial court ruled that the evidence provided 
by Blue Cross, that the McCoys' name and address was in the 
computerized database, and that their name and address was placed 
on a magnetic tape, and that the magnetic tape was used to 
generate the First Mailing, and the other evidence offered, was 
insufficient to prove the Arbitration Provisions were mailed to 
the McCoys. See Order (R. 276-279) 
By rejecting Blue Cross' proof on this issue, in the face of 
nothing more than Plaintiff's failure to recall that any of the 
three mailings were received, the trial court effectively 
converted the requirement of proof of mailing into one of proof 
of receipt. In contracts allowing change by mailing, under Utah 
law, "receipt . . . by the insured is not a condition precedent" 
5
 The rational of Diamond T, that the parties are bound by 
the explicit terms of their contract, remains the rule under the 
current Insurance Code. The Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992), 
considered "the legislative policy underlying the Insurance 
Code," stating that the Code expresses an intent that "freedom of 
contract" be maintained, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102(7), and that 
written contracts be the primary means by which this freedom to 
contract be exercised. See, e.g., id. §§ 31A-21-301 to -404 
(1991 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth detailed provisions 
authorizing and governing insurance contract clauses and setting 
forth acceptable methods by which various clauses can be modified 
by the parties). Jd. at 806. 
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to enforcement of the terms of the mailing. Diamond T, 361 P.2d 
at 667 (emphasis added). Blue Cross is not required to show 
proof of receipt, and the trial court erred in implicitly 
imposing this requirement contrary to Utah law. Service Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Markey, 83 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1955) ("The policy 
provision did not require mailing by registered mail and we can 
not read such a requirement into the contract."). 
In fact, under Utah law, the Affidavits submitted by Blue 
Cross defeat McCoy's denial of receipt of the Arbitration 
Agreements. The Utah Court of Appeal addressed this identical 
issue in Baumcrart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 647 
(Utah App. 1993). In Baumgart, the policy at issue provided that 
a cancellation notice "must be delivered or mailed by first class 
mail." id. at 651-52. The insured challenged the cancellation, 
presenting an affidavit "in which he claim[ed] he never actually 
received the cancellation notice. Id. at 652 (emphasis added). 
The Court of Appeals specifically found that because the insurer 
followed its "usual business procedure," and offered evidence 
that the cancellation was mailed, the insured's denial of receipt 
did not create an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary 
judgment: 
Even given [the insured's] allegation that he 
never received the cancellation notice, he only infers 
that [the insurer! never mailed it. He offers no 
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial" as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(e), 
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Id. at 652 (emphasis added) ; cf.. Bennett Motor Co. v. Lyon, 14 
Utah 2d 161, 380 P.2d 69, 71-72 (Utah 1963) (holding insufficient 
proof of mailing where insurer failed to show it had followed 
routine office mailing practice). 
In this case, it is undisputed that Blue Cross followed its 
usual and routine mailing procedures to send the McCoys no less 
than three mailings, each of which included an arbitration 
provision. As in Baumgart, the McCoys only challenge to this 
proof is a self-serving denial that it was received. As in 
Baumgart, a mere denial of receipt is insufficient. Accordingly, 
Blue Cross produced sufficient proof to show proof of mailing.6 
The obvious purpose of a contractual provision allowing 
notice by mailing -- rather than receipt -- is to allow amendment 
of the terms of a policy, held by thousands, through an efficient 
and effective manner, at minimum cost. The notice by mailing 
provision, a valid and enforceable term of the contract, shifted 
the risk to the policy holder that a mailing would not be 
received. The trial court's ruling deprived Blue Cross of this 
contract benefit, specifically intended to avoid the very problem 
in this case, and shifted risk of non-receipt (or failure to 
recall receipt) back to Blue Cross. 
6
 Blue Cross notes the cancellation of a policy has much 
greater adverse implication for an insured than an arbitration 
provision. Even in the cancellation context, the Baumgart court 
ruled that (1) notice by mailing was sufficient by the terms of 
the policy; and (2) that the proof-of-mailing requirement was 
met. 
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The trial court's alternative, requiring Blue Cross (and, 
implicitly, every other insurer in the State of Utah) to send all 
mailings to insureds by certified mail or similar means, would 
require delivery of literally hundreds of thousands of pieces of 
certified mail every year. Insurers would then be required to 
hire an entire staff for the sole purpose of collecting, 
compiling, reviewing the hundreds of thousands of certified mail 
receipts from each mailing, and cross referencing them to be sure 
each subscriber had acknowledged receipt. And, the insurer would 
be required to maintain these records indefinitely -- in this 
case for over ten years.7 Plaintiffs have not, and cannot, cite 
any authority requiring an insurer to deliver an arbitration 
provision added to an insurance policy to the insured by 
certified mail.8 
7
 Plaintiff was allegedly unaware of the existence of the 
Arbitration Provisions for approximately nine years from the date 
of the First Mailing. Specifically, it is undisputed that the 
McCoys enrolled under the Policy on or about October 16, 1985, 
and the Policy was amended in November of 1985, to become 
effective on January 1, 1986. Despite the Second and Third 
Mailings and the fact that Plaintiff's subsequent Explanation of 
Benefits forms refer to the right to arbitration, Plaintiff 
claims he did not discover this change until over nine years 
later, in January of 1995. Memorandum in Opposition, Yl 1/ 6/ P-
2 (R. 61). 
8
 For service of papers, once personal service is obtained, 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require nothing more than 
mailing to the "last known address" of a party or their attorney. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1). The Rules do not require proof of 
receipt. Nor does the Utah common law require more of insurers. 
Diamond-T, 361 P.2d at 667. 
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C. The McCoys' Accepted the Arbitration Agreement by 
Accepting the Blue Cross Policy for Over Two Years 
The trial court also failed to rule on, and therefore 
implicitly rejected, Blue Cross's argument that McCoy's failure 
to object to the arbitration provision for approximately two 
years after he became aware of the arbitration provision 
constituted an acceptance of its terms. (R. 233-234). 
In this case, Mr. McCoy retained the Blue Cross policy for 
over twelve years following the issuance of the Endorsement, and 
two years following his admitted knowledge of the arbitration 
clause before deciding it was time to object to the arbitration 
clause. Specifically, although McCoy admits to learning of the 
arbitration provision in January of 1995, (see McCoy I Affidavit 
at H 10) (R. 81), he did not object until Blue Cross moved to 
compel arbitration, and he still remained a subscriber until 
April 16, 1997. See Green II Affidavit at \ 18 (R. 245).9 
McCoy had at least two years to review the arbitration provisions 
of the policy and decide that he did not like the arbitration 
provision. 
9
 In his second affidavit, Plaintiff contended that, as 
with the arbitration language in the EOB, he did not understand 
that the arbitration provision was mandatory and not optional. 
(R. 266). However, Plaintiff does not, and cannot, dispute he 
was on actual notice of the arbitration provision in January, 
1995, and on constructive notice at least a year earlier from the 
EOB forms. Under Judge Winder's decision in Imperial Savings, 
infra, his continued retention of the policy and payment of 
premiums for at least two years after notice constitutes waiver 
of his right to object. 
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Plaintiff's failure to object constitutes an acceptance of 
the arbitration clause; it also belies his affidavit statement 
that he "would have sought another health insurance policy that 
did not require arbitration" had he known about the clause in his 
Blue Cross contract. See McCoy I Affidavit at *h 24 (R. 84-84). 
Instead, McCoy decided to voice his objection only after BCBSU 
attempted to have his dispute with it arbitrated, as McCoy's 
policy clearly mandates. 
The District Court for the Central District of Utah, Judge 
Winder presiding, ruled that an insured's retention of an 
insurance policy for an extended period of time, without 
objection within a reasonable time, "constitutes an acceptance of 
the Policy, including the arbitration provision." Imperial Sav. 
Ass'n v. Lewis, 730 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (D. Utah 1990); see also 
Western Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barela, 441 P.2d 47 (N.M. 
1968) (same); Phillis Dev. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 
457 P.2d 558 (Okla. 1969) (same). In Imperial Savings, Judge 
Winder determined that an insured's retention of the policy in 
question for only eleven months was sufficiently long to 
constitute an unreasonably long period of time without objection. 
Id. 
McCoy's failure to state his objection for at least two 
years, after he was admittedly on notice of the arbitration 
provision, constitutes waiver of any right to object to the 
inclusion of that arbitration provision in his insurance policy. 
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McCoy is therefore required to arbitrate any disputes over 
coverage under the Policy. 
D. Plaintiff Does Not Contest the Application of 
the Arbitration Provisions to the Claims. 
As noted, Plaintiff did not contest that that scope of the 
Arbitration Provisions is broad enough to cover all claims 
asserted in the Complaint. (R. 27-28, 60-77). As noted, 
arbitration is favored, and if "the scope of an arbitration 
clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, the clause should be 
construed in favor of arbitration . . . .nl° Lindon City v. 
Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981) (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court should 
direct that all of the claims in the Complaint proceed in 
arbitration. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it found that Plaintiff was not 
bound by the Arbitration Provisions, and declined to rule that 
Plaintiff's acceptance of the Policy for two years after he 
learned of the arbitration provision constituted a waiver. Blue 
10
 Plaintiff also argued below that (1) assent to the 
Arbitration Provisions was somehow procured by fraud, and (2) 
that under the Utah Arbitration Act, an allegation of fraud in 
the Complaint defeats arbitration. (R. 70-71; 74-75). 
However, under controlling law, a mere allegation of fraud 
as to the contract as a whole is insufficient to defeat 
arbitration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 
403-04 (1967). And, even were a general fraud allegation 
sufficient to defeat arbitration, Plaintiff failed to allege 
fraud with the requisite particularity. Educators Mutual 
Insurance Association v. Allied Property and Casualty and 
Insurance Company, 890 P. 2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1995). 
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Cross has come forward with sufficient and unrebutted evidence 
the Arbitration Provisions were mailed, and Plaintiff admits to 
at least receiving notice of some references to arbitration. 
Accordingly, Blue Cross is entitled to a reversal of the trial 
court's order denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration on all 
issues raised in the Complaint. 
DATED this ? 5T^rday of October, \l$s[ 
i 
JONES, WftLlpb, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Andrew H. Stone 
James E. Magleby 
Attorneys for Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the f^-r^ day of October, 1998, 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANTSS BRIEF, to the following: 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
David R. Olsen 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
f\ 
Clark Newhall 
136 South Main, 
Salt Lake City, 
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